As Gordon Brown gave up any hope of securing a Labour government on May 11th, 2010, the parliamentary arithmetic against him, many reasons for his failure were clear. Others, unbeknown to him, shaped his brief Prime Ministerial tenure in a way that was ultimately fatal. His lack of empathy and humanity in front of the camera was embarrassingly obvious while social policy errors such as the 10p tax band issue left many with bank deficits and feeling the effects of the leader in a more poignant way. The debate over whether it was his poor leadership that drove events between 2007 and 2010, or impersonal forces is vital for securing his legacy after a period of often hostile and narrow media representation that did not suit his qualities.

The End of the Party?
The period of New Labour will doubtless be remembered for the pivotal relationship between Tony Blair and Brown, the delaying of the ‘handover’ having great impacts on Brown as a politician. The fact that the index of Tony Blair’s book, A journey, includes twenty three references with the word “opposes TB” and only one “ally of TB” under Gordon Brown is symbolic of their combustible association. Blair points to the first half of 2002 when Brown was opposing extra university funding when “the creative tension, which up until then had been on balance positive, became on balance negative… the problem was… he wanted to freeze progress until he took over.” Such a character’s motivation for working in government must be called in to question if the sole aim of his public service is to reach the pinnacle. Brown was continually lambasted by his closest ally Ed Balls with sneering remarks such as “Why are you so weak? Why aren’t you forcing him out?” that in hindsight, did little to help proceedings bar knock his master’s confidence. This body of opinion was not kept internal. According to David Hill, Blair’s press aide “You’d have numbers of Brown people coming round to Number 10 saying “You shouldn’t be here any longer” at the height of tensions in 2004. This environment was not conducive to productive meetings and also laid foundations for any future administration under Brown that would be adversarial and unpleasant, as it turned out to be. One witness said “It isn’t a very nice place to work. However bad it sometimes looks from the outside, it’s far, far worse from the inside.” Brown could have taken action to limit the damage to his reputation as a bullying figure – typical behaviour as Chancellor included him simply withdrawing from sharing information about budgets with his Prime Minister until hours before announcements. It raises the question of how as Prime Minister, Brown would have dealt with the same activities from his Chancellor, Alistair Darling. It is my opinion that this relationship had a top-down effect on Brown and his staff and indirectly negatively influenced much of Brown’s three years in power.
This behaviour within the corridors of power was not helpful for his public reputation out of them. Brown was ridiculed for his personality from academics and YouTube viewers alike; David Runciman commented in The Guardian “Brown is an almost pathological version of a closed-off politician…. Chancellors are meant to be closed off. But the relentless exposure of being Prime Minister makes that sort of closed-off politician vulnerable.” Comparisons with Tony Blair, who famously stated his intent to make politics “cleaner than clean” and was elected on this basis, do not look favourable on Brown. The Prime Minister was ruthlessly exposed on several occasions and this was partly down to the fact that from the start, Number 10 was “grievously under-manned.” There had been an almost total removal of the political staff which left wide gaps of experience. Despite the (short) honeymoon, a very senior civil servant described the Brownite team as “under-prepared and arrogant”. This is astounding considering the former Chancellor had the longest wait in British politics to assume his role. On paper he was the best qualified Prime Minister to take on the role, with more than a decade to think about his plans, nearly a year’s notice that there would be a vacancy and six weeks of formal transition to plan his arrival. This lack of cohesiveness between old and new staff must be put down to the quarrels of the previous decade. However he was let down on many occasions: Sue Nye endured his wrath after ‘bigot-gate’ in which, down to no fault of his own, Brown’s controversial (but private) views were broadcasted to millions. This privacy did little to quell the anger of the nation that saw Brown as having lost touch with his working class roots. In addition, the YouTube video whose content was overshadowed by a fraudulent smile that so typified his lack of genuine emotion, should never have been broadcasted. Tony Blair writes “He had his own pollsters and unfortunately they used to give him unbelievably duff advice.” The poor personal polling results were not singularly down to his staff but were often brought upon himself. After the expenses scandal, an event almost entirely beyond his control, the recurring theme of Brown being unable to grasp control of the matter and come out with a statesmanlike nobility and prestige was repeated. Brown was left repeatedly trailing behind Cameron and Clegg as he tried to pre-empt the original outcry by proposing to abolish the allowance for second homes all together. However, after failing to consult his MPs he was forced to withdraw – rash action that is not expected from a Prime Minister. Another issue where Brown failed to predict public opinion was that of the Ghurkas. He lacked the emotional intelligence or the media savvy to grasp the importance of sentiment and was left looking out of touch, an issue that never surfaced with Blair.
In other areas of government, Brown’s performance was poor. His move to place Alistair Darling, an unostentatious lawyer, as Chancellor reinforced his bullying reputation. Darling was vulnerable to the expletive ridden tirades from Brown and took much of the brunt of his anger during the dark days of the recession. The attempt to shift blame to a ‘less competent’ Chancellor looked unattractive in the light of ten years of wanting to leave the job. When Brown started directly talking to Mervyn King, cutting out any treasury input, the crucial relationship was looking at all time low. Andrew Rawnsley writes “Alistair Darling also spent that August worrying about his future. The spinning against him from within Number 10 was becoming more nakedly aggressive… as the government’s acolytes sought to displace blame for the government’s travails.” This behaviour could be interpreted as a psychological reaction against his years in the treasury. On purely pragmatic terms, this was a futile attempt to restore his own political reputation by damaging those around him – Brown had lost his sense of cabinet government and was ruthlessly kicking those around him to keep his head above water. During his early period in power, Darling used to joke that he was “trying to find where Gordon had put all the money”, the deep irony being that it was Brown from which all Darling’s troubles stemmed. Brown always had something of a troubled psyche, many point towards his failure to gain the leadership in 1994 will others point towards to the long and painful weeks spent in recovery after sustaining an injury to his eye in his adolescence. This left him blind in one eye and a tendency to brood over life’s injustices. In terms of the party, most detrimental actions stemmed directly from Brown and his personality. For example, Caroline Flint’s resignation was due to being “treated as female window dressing” after backing the Prime Minister before he failed to promote her. Of the ministerial resignations that took place, very few were down to incompetence but rather the majority were protests and the minority for “family reasons” that casted suspicions over political motives.

A bitter rivalry that ultimately broke the Labour Party?
During the rich tapestry of bank failures and lost information, Brown’s policy aims changed from a long term plan of “new government with new priorities” to simply appeasing the masses. Successes included the car scrappage scheme that boosted the car industry but appeared little more than a gimmick; the same can be said of the 2.5% reduction in VAT. Furthermore, a symptom (rather than a cause) of the Labour troubles was that his own colleagues turned on him in a series of party-wide damaging actions. David Milliband wrote in a famous article for the Guardian “I disagreed with Margaret Thatcher, but at least it was clear what she stood for”, this attack placed Milliband on the waiting list to take over, although his timing was poor – he made his move just as Parliament was heading into its Summer break and potential regicide would have to wait until September. Ultimately, the decision to remain with Brown for the general election looked more like a judgment from the candidate leaders to remain detached from Brown until after the inevitable loss whereupon they could start again without being tarnished. Brown’s theme to promote equality seemed a tired motif that had to cede to other priorities, which were all susceptible to the Milliband criticism of lacking ideological principle. It can be said that both Brown and his colleagues were guilty for the lack of unity shown at such a crucial time, the former with insufficient charisma and the latter for not backing him when Brown was at this most vulnerable.
Although the financial circumstances that met his term were unfavourable, he had the economic qualifications to deal with them. The crisis held back his ambitious plans for constitutional and social reform and this was inevitable. Nevertheless, a Churchillian attitude beckoned to get through the tough times but a recurring theme of hypocrisy held him back. In 1997 he proclaimed “The city has demonstrated the best qualities of our country, what I describe as the British genius”, and in 2004 he said “I want us to do more to encourage the risk-takers.” These fateful words undermined his whole campaign to bring the UK through the recession and were not helped by the jeering heard after his “We have saved the world” moment. This is another key point in time when his great feat of keeping the banks open was overshadowed by a minor publicity slip. The weekend of 11-12th October was fundamental to the UK economy. At 5am on the 11th, with just two hours left before the necessary deadline, an agreement was made between the officials to secure the nation’s finances. This was Brown at his best, and sad that it was insufficiently brought to public consciousness. The inability of Brown to react to the public anger towards the city, let the nimble Cameron claim moral superiority and attack Brown for his ineptitude, declaring the city as “markets without morality and capitalism without a conscience.”
This was shameful from a leader that had encouraged further risk taking months before, but at times it seemed Cameron was immune from malevolence due to his innocent, youthful looks. It is contentious whether Cameron’s own strength led him to win the election. Tory backbenchers were knowingly unhappy at his failure to convey what they stood for and thus offer a credible alternative to Labour. His reputation as a career politician with little life experience should have looked pitiful next to the strong Scotsman with an agenda for equality. Instead he was described by Blair as a “flip-flop” because he didn’t know which political way to go. Blair goes on in his memoirs to describe Cameron as “clever and people friendly…but he had not gone through the arduous but ultimately highly educative apprenticeship I had in the 1980s and early 90s… he was pretty unhoned.” To be embarrassed at PMQs so regularly by an unhoned opponent did little for Brown’s stature. His withered looks represented his battle against the young Cameron, the real “heir to Blair”. The TV debates that took place highlighted the fact that Cameron’s policies were not astoundingly more popular than the Labour ideas; it was simply his presentation that appealed. The Labour strategists looked on in bewilderment as the elder statesman repeatedly commented on his agreement with Nick Clegg, a relatively peripheral figure. The two junior men lyrically danced about the tired Brown, managing to leave him floundering, declaring the success of nationalising Northern Rock, a forced move that harked back to the old Labour years and emphasised the need for a change.
However, the inextricable link between the party and its leader means that not only do Prime Ministers have to compete on personal level, they are also tarnished psychologically in the minds of all voters in their reaction to party actions. While campaign fliers awash with leaders’ faces and the presidential behaviour of Blair, transcending the party, would sometimes suggest the party owes everything to the leader, the relationship is more balanced. While all politicians’ careers end in failure, they are all owed to the party, one cannot survive the other. In Gordon Brown’s case, his Prime Ministerial career was owed in the majority to Blair and a superb intellect. Ironically the same man caused his downfall (and his party’s) with his belated resignation. Additionally his fall was due to his failure to master modern society’s expectations of a democratically elected, people friendly official. While Gordon Brown’s helm was the main factor in the electoral loss, it was ultimately the relationship between the two that caused the failure.
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